The components of this second half of the definition of "terrorist activity" are explained in more detail below.
This part of the definition states that, in part, a terrorist activity is an act or omission, in or outside Canada, committed "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause".
The motive requirement in the definition is actually a limitation to any prosecution. This requirement distinguishes terrorist activity from other forms of criminality that are intended to intimidate people by means of violence. If such a limitation were not placed within the definition of 'terrorist activity' then leaders of organized crime would fall within the definition.
Moreover, the motive requirement reflects the principle of restraint. In this regard, in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, a case involving the constitutionality of the crime of wilfully promoting hatred, the Supreme Court of Canada quoted with approval the statement of the Law Reform Commission of Canada that, "The principle of restraint requires lawmakers to concern themselves not just with whom they want to catch, but also with whom they do not want to catch" (at 775).
Some Canadian legal scholars have argued that criminalizing motive is contrary to Canadian criminal law. However, there are other instances in Canadian criminal law where motive is clearly relevant. For example, section 231(3) of the Criminal Code defines planned and deliberate (first degree) murder to include murder when it is committed pursuant to an arrangement under which money passes from one person to another (i.e., a contract killer). Section 430(4.1) of the Code, created by the Anti-terrorism Act, prohibits committing mischief in relation to property primarily used for religious worship where it is motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin. Furthermore, section 718(2)(a)(i) of the Code is an aggravated sentence provision that allows a judge to increase sentence where the crime is motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor.
Moreover, the motive requirement is useful because it aims directly at the ideological dimension of terrorism which seeks to undermine the normative foundations of liberal democracy. At the same time, nothing in these words targets any particular cultural, religious or ethnic group or any particular ideology.
There are a number of safeguards to ensure that motive requirement is not subject to abuse. The interpretive clause found in section 83.01(1.1) ensures that the expression of political, religious or ideological thought, belief or opinion, unaccompanied by harmful conduct, does not fall within the definition of "terrorist activity". In addition, the consent of the relevant Attorney General is required for the prosecution of a terrorism offence (section 83.24 of the Code).
With regard to other Commonwealth countries, the anti-terrorism laws in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and South Africa all contain a similar motive requirement. Independent reviews of the UK and Australian definitions of terrorism have concluded that the motive requirement should be retained. The UK Government has recently proposed expanding its motive requirement.
This part of the definition requires an additional intention to intimidate the public, or a segment of the public, with regards to its security, including its economic security, and to compel a person, a government, or a domestic or international organization to do or refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada.
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Updated to April 1, 2008.